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This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular 
we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In 
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firm’s and the lender’s tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders’ decision to default is 
always distorted. 
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hold. 1 Introduction
One of the basic neutral tax designs is the ￿ imputed income method￿(see
Boadway and Bruce, 1984). Over the last decade this method has become
popular in Europe. At the beginning of the ￿ 90s, the Nordic countries in-
troduced Dual Income Tax (DIT) which allows a lower tax rate on capital
income. In the same period, the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991) proposed
the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) and subsequently other countries,
such as Austria, Croatia and Italy, applied dual tax systems.1 More recently,
the Skauge Committee has proposed in Norway a tax system which shares
some important features with the ACE tax system.2
The imputed income system allows two alternative treatments of the cost
of debt. On the one hand, debt is deductible at the risk-free rate: this system
will be named R-based. On the other hand, debt is deductible at the interest
rate actually paid: we will call it the S-based system3. This option, which
is quite common in existing tax systems, is supported by Keen and King
(2002). They stress the fact that the computation of the tax base is easy
as it is based on book values. Moreover they argue that the deduction of
actual interest expenses does not distort ￿rms￿choices as long as debt is
competitively supplied. In this case all rents accrue to shareholders, and
taxation is neutral. This point is proven by Bond and Devereux (2003)
(hereafter BD), who show that an S-based system is neutral under default
risk even if the ￿rm￿ s and the lender￿ s tax rate are di⁄erent4. However,
BD point out that their result holds on condition that capital markets are
perfectly e¢ cient and information is symmetric. If, instead, capital markets
are imperfect and in particular information is asymmetric, borrowers and
lenders might collude in order to avoid taxation. In this case, the government
1For further details see e.g. Bordignon et al. (2001), Cnossen (2005), Fehr and Wiegard
(2001), Keen and King (2002), Keen (2003) and Zodrow (2003).
2The Norwegian proposal entails the introduction of a Rate-of-Return Allowance (RRA)
at the level of domestic personal shareholders, rather than at the corporate level. The RRA
is calculated as the risk-free interest rate multiplied by the basis of the share (see S￿rensen,
2003).
3For a comparison between the S-based and the R-based system see Becker and Fuest
(2005).
4This property makes dual systems attractive at least in a closed economy (see Bond,
2000). As recently proven by Panteghini (2004), however, the imputed method can be
attractive even in an open economy if multinational ￿rms can decide not only whether but
also when to invest.
2would require a greater amount of information to ￿ght tax avoidance.
In this article we aim to show that the neutrality properties of the S-based
system are less general than thought, and that distortions may arise even
under perfect credit market e¢ ciency and symmetric information. To show
this we will depart from BD, who treat default as an exogenous event, and
introduce two well-known default conditions. The ￿rst one refers to protected
debt. In this case default may be triggered when the ￿rms￿asset value falls
to the debt￿ s value. This means that debt is approximated with a positive
net-covenant.5 The second default condition regards unprotected debt, and
implies that default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders. When the
￿rm￿ s net cash ￿ ow is negative, shareholders may have the opportunity to
inject further equity capital in order to meet the ￿rm￿ s debt obligations. As
long as they issue new capital and pay the interest rate they can exploit future
recoveries in the ￿rm￿ s pro￿tability. In this case, shareholders behave as if
they owned a put option, whose exercise leads to default.6 It will be shown
that neutrality holds only under fully protected debt ￿nancing. If, instead,
debt is unprotected, a twofold distortion may arise. Firstly, investment may
be distorted unless a uniform tax rate is levied on both shareholders and the
lender. Secondly, taxation always a⁄ects shareholders￿decision to default.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a continuous-
time model and analyzes both protected and unprotected debt. Section 3
describes the e⁄ects of S-based taxation on the ￿rm￿ s value. Section 4 de-
rives the neutrality results under protected and unprotected debt ￿nancing.
Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses their policy implications.
2 The model
In line with Leland (1994) we apply a continuous-time model describing the
investment decision made by a representative ￿rm. At time 0; the ￿rm decides
whether to undertake an in￿nitely-lived project, whose cost is I: investment
is thus undertaken if the project Net Present Value is positive.7
5For further details see Brennan and Schwartz (1978), and Smith and Wardner (1977).
6As pointed out by Leland (1994) both protected and unprotected debt are widely used.
In particular, minimum net-worth requirements, implied by protected debt, are common
in short-term debt ￿nancing, whereas long-term debt instruments are usually unprotected
or only partially protected.
7For simplicity, we assume that the ￿rm cannot postpone its investment decision.
3The ￿rm￿ s EBIT at time t, de￿ned as ￿t; is subject to a shock and, in
particular, follows a geometric Brownian motion
d￿t
￿t
= ￿dz with ￿0 > 0; (1)
where ￿ is the instantaneous standard deviation of d￿t
￿t .8
The assumptions on the ￿rm￿ s capital structure are the following:
1. the risk-free interest rate r is ￿xed;
2. credit markets are perfectly competitive;
3. information is symmetric;
4. at time 0, the ￿rm borrows some resources and pays a constant coupon
C ￿ ￿0, which cannot be renegotiated.
The ￿rst three assumptions describe a perfectly e¢ cient setting. Assump-
tion 4 deserves some comment. It is worth noting that setting C and then
computing the market value of debt is equivalent to set ￿rst, the value of
debt and then, compute the equilibrium interest rate.9 Assumption 4 also
means that debt maturity is in line with the investment lifetime.10
Default occurs when the ￿rm does not meet its debt obligation. In this
case it is expropriated by the lender. Let us next introduce the two default
conditions.
De￿nition 1 Under protected debt ￿nancing, default takes place when ￿t
falls to an exogenously given threshold point e ￿p.
As will be shown, full debt protection is ensured if the threshold point e ￿p
is equal to C:
8With no loss of generality, we assume that the drift of the Brownian motion is nil.
9Notice that the introduction of any trade-o⁄is beyond the scope of this article. In the
absence of any distress cost, therefore, C is not the result of an optimal choice but rather
is exogenously given.
10This assumption is realistic. As shown for instance by Graham and Harvey (2001)
more than 63% of the US ￿rms surveyed state that debt maturity is aimed at matching
with assets￿lifetime. On the other hand, BD assume a one-period debt ￿nancing strategy
for a two-period investment project. However, they argue that the quality of results does
not change if a new debt issue in the following period is assumed (see Bond and Devereux,
1999).
4De￿nition 2 Under unprotected debt ￿nancing, the threshold point e ￿u is
chosen optimally by shareholders at time 0.
In both cases, the existence of symmetric information means that, at time
0, the creditor knows e ￿i with i = p;u before lending.
3 The tax system
Let us next introduce the S-based system, which allows the deduction of both
e⁄ective interest payments and the opportunity cost of equity ￿nance. Under
full loss-o⁄set11, the tax base will be
n








for i = p;u and t ￿ 0:
As can be seen the relief on equity ￿nance is equal to the default-free interest






; that is the dif-
ference between the historical cost of the investment project and the initial
value of debt.13
Contrary to cash-￿ ow systems, tax bene￿ts are distributed along the in-
vestment￿ s lifetime. This implies that, in the event of default, shareholders
would fail to obtain a full tax bene￿t, unless an ad hoc rebate were granted.













for i = p;u; (2)
which is computed when default takes place. As shown in (2) the rebate is
equal to the tax rate ￿ multiplied by the di⁄erence between the book value
of the asset, i.e. I, and the net present value of the subsequent pre-tax cash
￿ ow in the event of default, i.e.
e ￿i
r . This means that, under symmetric
information, the government observes e ￿i and then sets the rebate, thereby
ensuring full compensation.
11For a discussion on the e⁄ects of no loss-o⁄set, see e.g. Panteghini (2001, 2005).
12This rule, which only requires the knowledge of book values, is in line with the ACE
tax proposal. See e.g. Devereux and Freeman (1991).




represents both the market and book value
of debt at time 0.
53.1 The value of debt
Like the ￿rm, the lender is subject to S-based tax, though its tax rate may
di⁄er from the ￿rm￿ s one.
Before default, the lender￿base is given by the di⁄erence between the





. In line with BD, we assume that when default occurs, the
tax relief is proportional to the net present value of the subsequent pre-tax
cash ￿ ows of the project. In this case, the opportunity cost of debt will be r
times the market value of debt when ￿ = e ￿i; i.e. Di
￿
e ￿i; e ￿i;C
￿
. Given the















e ￿i; e ￿i;C
￿i
after default.
Under market e¢ ciency, the value of debt at time 0 is such that the
















holds. Equation (3) entails the equality between a risk-free asset whose
return is r and a risky asset (the lender￿ s credit) whose return is the e⁄ective
interest rate, net of the default risk premium. As can be seen, taxation may
be distortive since any change in the rate h must be o⁄set by a change in the
value of debt in order for condition (3) to hold. Solving (3) we can write the
value of debt at time 0 (see Appendix A) as a weighted average between the















































measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the





This is due to the fact that an increase in the rate h raises the after-














Let us next analyze the impact of the default conditions on the value of
debt. By de￿nition, full protection implies that the value of debt is equal to





￿ = r: (6)
Equality (6) implies that full protection holds if e ￿p = C. It is thus clear
that taxation does not a⁄ect the value of debt. This is the case implicitly
analyzed by BD.
When debt is unprotected, the trigger point e ￿u is not necessarily equal to
C: In this case, default entails that the lender￿ s expected cash ￿ ow changes
from C to e ￿u: Using (4) we obtain the e⁄ective interest rate as the sum of









￿ C ￿ e ￿u
r | {z }
default risk premium
: (7)
3.2 The value of equity
To compute the value of equity we must introduce a boundary condition
regarding default. We know that at point ￿ = e ￿i shareholders are expro-




















for i = p;u: (8)
14For details on this condition see Leland (1994) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).

















































is the net-of-tax cash ￿ ow. As shown in (9), the value of equity consists of two
terms. The ￿rst term,
Y i(e ￿i;￿0;C)
r ; is a perpetual rent proportional to after-
tax cash ￿ ow. The second term measures the overall e⁄ect of default. This












Y i(e ￿i;e ￿i;C)
r
￿
; i.e. the tax rebate
received in the event of default minus future cash ￿ ow lost by expropriation.





di⁄ers from the lender￿ s one.15
4 Neutrality results
Let us next analyze the neutrality properties of the S-based tax system. Here
we deal with both real and ￿nancial neutrality, when the ￿rm￿ s decisions are





















Following Brown (1948) we can thus state that







= (1 ￿ ￿)NPV
￿ (￿0); (11)
where NPV ￿ (￿0) ￿
￿0











8As pointed out by Johansson (1969, p.104), equation (11) entails that
an ￿ identical ranking of alternative investments is obtained in a pre-tax and
post-tax pro￿tability analysis￿ . Moreover, condition (11) implies that the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds.
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e ￿i; e ￿i;C
￿io
measures the overall tax distortion. This distortion consists of two terms.
The ￿rst one measures the present value of the after-tax risk premium before
default. The second term is given by the expected devaluation of debt con-




= 0; real neutrality
is ensured.
The second neutrality condition regards unprotected debt. In this case,
indeed, shareholders can decide when to default. De￿ning e ￿u
LF as the default
trigger point in the absence of taxation, we can thus state that
Condition 2 Financial neutrality holds if default timing is not a⁄ected by
taxation, i.e. e ￿u = e ￿u
LF.
4.1 Protected debt
Let us start with protected debt ￿nancing. We can write the following
Proposition 1 If debt is fully protected the S-based system is neutral.
Proof. See Appendix C.





= Dp (C;￿0;C): Moreover, the lender￿ s post-
default claim is equal to Di
￿




r ; i = u;p (see Appendix C):










fall to zero. The intuition behind this result is straightforward:
9the cash ￿ ow tax and equivalently, any imputed income tax systems can be
thought of as ensuring relief for both the risk-free rate and the risk premium
(see Devereux, 2003). As shown in (6), however, the default risk premium
falls to zero and any distortive e⁄ect of h on the value of debt vanishes.
4.2 Unprotected debt
Proposition 1 is in line with BD￿ s ￿ndings. When debt is unprotected, how-
ever, results are quite di⁄erent. In this case, the default trigger point e ￿u is










Solving (13) we obtain
Proposition 2 Under unprotected debt ￿nancing the inequalities e ￿u < e ￿u
LF <
C hold 8￿.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 2 shows that shareholders postpone their default decision.
To get the intuition behind the result it is worth noting that e ￿u
LF < C;
namely that, without taxation, the default option is exercised when the net
cash ￿ ow is negative. This is due to the fact that default is an irreversible
choice16: shareholders are aware that the exercise of the put option entails
the irreversible loss of any opportunity to exploit future pro￿t recoveries.
Under the S-based system, the lower the point e ￿u is, the greater is the value
of the rebate received by shareholders. Not surprisingly therefore we have
e ￿u < e ￿u
LF; i.e. default timing is delayed.17
Let us next focus on real e⁄ects. We can prove the following:
Proposition 3 Under unprotected debt ￿nancing a real distortion arises if







￿ (1 ￿ ￿)NPV
￿ (￿0) _ (￿ ￿ h): (14)
16Remember that the default trigger point e ￿u is set at time 0 and is known by the
lender.
17Notice that this behaviour is stimulated by full loss-o⁄set provisions. In this case,
loss-making ￿rms enjoy a tax bene￿t and may be induced to further postpone default.
10Proof. See Appendix E.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. Assume that initially
the equality ￿ = h holds. Then suppose that h is cut. This tax rate












; thereby increasing the value of equity. Propo-














(1 ￿ ￿)NPV ￿ (￿0) holds and we have overinvestment.18 The converse is true
if h is raised.
The above result is not surprising if we disregard the ￿rm￿ s ownership
and rather, focus on the project value. We can in fact state that inequality
￿ > h is equivalent to an expected tax rate cut occurring whenever ￿ falls
to e ￿u: This expected tax cut thus stimulates investment.19 The converse is
true if ￿ < h:
5 Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this article we have shown that the neutrality properties of an S-based
system depend on the default condition assumed. In particular, we have
shown that both real and ￿nancial neutrality hold when debt is protected.
When debt is unprotected, results are di⁄erent. Real neutrality is ensured
only under uniform taxation. Moreover, ￿nancial neutrality never holds, as
shareholders are induced to delay their default decision.
In a companion article (Panteghini, 2004) we showed that an R-based sys-
tem, allowing for deduction of debt at the risk-free rate, ensures both real and
￿nancial neutrality irrespective of whether debt is protected or unprotected.
This allows us to conclude that in terms of neutrality, a R-based system is
preferable to a S-based one even in perfectly e¢ cient capital markets.
18Notice that under full debt protection, the default premium is nil and, therefore, this
distortive e⁄ect disappears.
19A similar point is made by Bond and Devereux (1995) where they show that any
expected future tax rate change is distortive.
11A The computation of (3) and (4)























where ￿ [:] is the expectation operator.
Let us ￿rst focus on the pre-default value of debt. Expanding the RHS
























































Manipulating (17) one easily obtains (3).





















where ￿1 and ￿2 are the positive and negative root of the characteristic








(1 ￿ h)￿t + hrDi
￿











We can now compute the values of Gi
j and Li
j for j = 1;2: To do so we must
introduce two boundary conditions, which are in line with the assumption
12of perfectly e¢ cient capital markets.20 Firstly, we assume that no ￿nancial
bubbles exist. This means that Gi
1 = Li
1 = 0: Secondly, we assume that when















This implies that Li













2; let the two branches (18) and (19) meet at point ￿t = e ￿i:























































B The computation of (9)


























20For further details on this boundary conditions see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
13As shown in (24), in the event of default, shareholders are expropriated and





Let us next focus on the pre-default case. Expanding the RHS of (24),























































Let us next compute F i
j for j = 1;2: Notice that, in the absence of any
bubble, we have F i
1 = 0: To compute F i
2 we use (26) and apply the Value
Matching Condition (8). We thus obtain
Y i
￿











































Substituting (27) into (26), at point ￿0 yields (9).
C Proof of Proposition 1


























Substituting (28) and (29) into (10) yields (11). This proves Proposition 1.￿
14D Proof of Proposition 2












































































@e ￿u = 0:
where
@H(e ￿u;￿0;C)























































































































































































































To analyze the distortive e⁄ect of taxation, recall (30), and set ￿ = h = 0:







By contradiction we can now prove that e ￿u < e ￿u
LF: Assume ab absurdo





< 0. This entails that no solution e ￿u > C ensures a
maximum. Moreover, assume ab absurdo that
￿2
￿2￿1C < e ￿u < C: In this case
(31) does not hold: thus no solution can be found. Therefore, the solution
must be such that inequality e ￿u <
￿2
￿2￿1C holds: In this case, indeed, equation




> 0: This proves Proposition 2.￿
E Proof of Proposition 3
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= (1 ￿ ￿)NPV
￿ (￿0)￿
￿





















Since e ￿u < C; we can write (14), thereby proving Proposition 3.￿
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